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Abstract
A unique panel of retail prices spanning 123 cities in 79 countries from 1990 to 2005 is
used to uncover the novel properties of long-run international price dispersion. At the PPP
level, almost all of price dispersion is attributed to unskilled wage dispersion. At the level of
individual goods and services, the average contribution of these wages is signicantly reduced,
reecting that good-specic sources of price dispersion, such as trade costs and good-specic
markups, tend to average out across goods. At the LOP level, borders and distance contribute
about equally to price dispersion that is rising in the distribution share.
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1 Introduction
The Law-of-One-Price is the theoretical proposition that, absent o¢ cial and natural barriers to
trade, international prices are equated in common currency units, and a laborers purchasing power
(i.e., real wage) is determined only by their labor productivity. A stark empirical implication of
this proposition is that the cross-country correlation between price levels and wage levels is zero.
As is well known, this implication of goods market integration is grossly at odds with the data.
The Penn E¤ect, in recognition of the ambitious work of Heston, Kravis, Lipsey, who developed the
Penn World Tables, shows a strong positive correlation between international price levels and per
capita income.
Figure 1 shows the microeconomic counterpart of this fact using the panel data of our study.
Microeconomic in this context means the prices of individual goods and services across cities of
the world, as opposed to aggregate price levels at the national level. Specically, each point in the
scattterplot is the price of an individual good or service in a particular city plotted against the
hourly wage of domestic cleaning help in that particular city. Prices and wages have been averaged
over the period 1990 to 2005 to eliminate transitory deviations associated with business cycles and
exchange rate uctuations.1 As far as we know, this is the rst study to use time-averaged data to
study long-run deviations from the LOP and Purchasing Power Parity. The points labeled with an
asterisk are price levels computed as expenditure-weighted averages of the individual prices.
In Figure 1, the estimated line through the scatter of price levels has a slope of 0:52 and an R2
value of 0:37.2 In words: a doubling of wages is associated with a 52 percent higher price level.
This nding is typically associated with the seminal works of Harrod (1933), Balassa (1964), and
Samuelson (1964); however, the HBS theory assumes that LOP holds for traded goods but not
for non-traded goods. According to this view, called the classical dichotomy, there should be a
horizontal line traced out by traded goods for which the LOP holds and a line with a slope of
unity for non-traded goods. The trivial example is the hourly wage of domestic help itself, which
produces a slope of one by recognizing that the market price of this non-traded service is, in fact,
the hourly wage for unskilled labor. Figure 1, obviously, is not much more sympathetic to the
classical dichotomy than it is to complete market integration.
1Specically, there are 300 goods and services (up to missing observations) for each city and there are 123 cities
in total. The prices and wages used to construct these time-averages are from the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
World Cost of Living Survey which spans 79 countries.
2The estimation is by geometric mean regression to consider for possible measurement errors in both the price and
wage data. A common set of consumption expenditure weights are used for all cities. These consumption expenditure
weights are taken from the PWT, averaged across all OECD nations.
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To help resolve this puzzle, this paper estimates distribution and trade cost wedges using a
trade model augmented with a retail distribution sector (developed in Crucini and Yilmazkuday,
2009). We have two sets of results, one for relative price levels (PPP) and the other at the level of
individual goods (LOP). Regarding PPP, the variance of price levels for international city pairs is
found to be almost entirely explained by international wage di¤erences, 92% by our estimate. Both
the absolute amount of price dispersion and the relative importance of wage di¤erences falls when
the sample is restricted to cities in countries at similar stages of development while the role of retail
productivity increases. The contribution of cross-city wage di¤erences falls to 8% when the sample
is restricted to city pairs within the same country. It is important to keep in mind that the amount
of price level dispersion across cities that are located in the same country is a trivial 3-5%; as such,
a modest amount of wage or retail productivity variance goes a long way in terms of accounting for
the lions share of the variance. The thrust of the PPP analysis is that when long run price level
di¤erences are consequential, the di¤erences are attributable to the level of economic development,
not traditional trade frictions.
The table turns dramatically in favor of borders and trade costs and away from wages and retail
productivity, as explanatory factors, when the focus is LOP deviations. Pooling all international city
pairs, the explanatory power of the HBS theory (wage dispersion) falls by a factor of three, to about
32%. Traditional theories of trade that emphasis distance and borders now account for the lions
share of price disperison, about 41%. City e¤ects account for almost none of the international LOP
variation. Essentially, this is because international LOP deviations are both large and idiosyncratic
to the good once we condition on the wage level. The remainder is a residual term, which may
reect good and location-specic markups as well as other variables omitted from the model.
2 The Model
The model consists of an arbitrary number of cities, each inhabited by two representative agents.
One representative agent is a manufacturer who specializes in the production of a single good and
exports this good to all other cities of the world. The second representative agent is a retailer who
imports all of the manufactured goods and makes the goods available in retail outlets in her city of
operation. To import a good, the retailer must pay an iceberg shipping cost over the factory-gate
price in the producers location. The shipping cost is hypothesized to be increasing in the distance
shipped and may take a discrete jump if a national border is crossed. The retailing activity is labor
intensive with the retailers allocating their non-leisure time across all of the goods they sell. Some
3
cities have more productive retailers than others which is captured by total-factor-productivity
(TFP) at the retail level, specic to the city, common to all goods the retailer sells. Part of the
TFP e¤ect might be local public infrastructure and private capital, neither of which are modeled
here.3
Turning to the details, the retailing technology for each good is Cobb-Douglas in retailer hours,
Nij, and the quantity of the imported manufactured good, Gij, with TFP level, Zj:
Rij = ZjN
i
ij G
1 i
ij . (1)
While the production function is restricted to be common to all locations, it is very exible across
goods. It captures pure labor services (e.g., baby-sitting services) with i equal to one and internet
purchases (e.g., Amazon.com book purchases), i equal to zero, and all points in between.
The retailer in city, j, minimizes cost of each good, i, by optimally choosing the two inputs
needed to produce the good: i) the amount of the traded input, Gij, to import and ii) the fraction
of her time devoted to the good, Nij:
min
Nij ;Gij
(WjNij +QijGij) (2)
Note that the Wj reects the single opportunity cost of time relevant to the problem, that of the
retailer. The two constraints on this minimization problem are the production function, (1) and
that total hours available in the period are exhausted between leisure hours and total time allocated
to all retail goods.
The resulting retail price is a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of the price (inclusive of trade cost) that
the retailer paid to acquire the traded input, Qij, and the retailers opportunity cost of time, Wj:
Pij =
Wij Q
1 i
ij
Zj
. (3)
It is important to note that the weights on the two inputs are good specic. Not surprisingly,
all retail prices decrease in proportion to total factor productivity in retailing, Zj and increase
in proportion to retail input prices, Wj and Qij (with the factor of proportionality being their
respective cost shares).
The factory-gate price of the traded input is determined as follows. A manufacturer in each
city operates a simple linear technology, Yi = AiNmi , and maximizes prots from world-wide sales.
She charges the same factory-gate price to all destination markets, Qii = fWi=Ai where fWi is the
3In an earlier version of the paper, Crucini and Yilmazkuday (2009), we included capital as a factor of production.
The simpler formulation here focuses on aggregate retail e¢ ciency, labor in the retail sector and trade costs. To the
extent public and private infrastructure capital alter e¢ ciency, these would be allocated to the TFP term.
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manufacturing wage in city i and Ai is productivity in manufacturing. The complete equilibrium
solution to the model is presented in a separate technical appendix (see Crucini and Yilmazkuday
(2009)).
For the purposes of studying relative prices, the only remaining piece of information needed is
the relationship between the factory gate price and the destination price. We assume a proportional,
good and location-specic shipping cost: Qij = (1 +  ij)Qii.
The prediction of this model for the common-currency relative price of good i in city j relative
to city k is:
Pij
Pik
=
Zk
Zj

Wj
Wk
i Qij
Qik
1 i
. (4)
Taking logs gives the object of interest, equation (1):
pijk =  zjk + iwjk + (1  i) qijk
where pijk = log (Pij=Pik), zjk = log (Zj=Zk), wjk = log (Wj=Wk), and qijk = log (Qij=Qik).
3 The Estimation Approach
Taking the model to the data involves a number of empirical challenges. We have rich data
with which to measure LOP deviations and reliable measures of wages across cities in our panel,
but we lack both measures of retail productivity and micro-level data on traded input prices. This
section describes the three-step approach taken to identify distribution shares, the is for each
good, city-level retail productivities, the zjs, and trade costs between any city pair at the good
level.
The rst stage utilizes the available data on price and wages across cities to estimate a good-
specic distribution share i, by regressing LOP deviations on the wage ratio:
pijk = iwjk + ijk , (5)
where, according to the model, the residual is ijk =  zjk+(1  i) qijk. The slope parameter in the
relationship between prices and relative wages in the HBS scatterplot of Figure 1 is the empirical
counterpart to i.
The parameter, i, is estimated by geometric mean regression (GMR). That is, we estimate the
following two regressions:
pijk = biwjk + ijk
wjk = bipijk + "ijk .
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The GMR estimate is the geometric average of the coe¢ cient from the rst regression and the
inverse of the coe¢ cient from the second regression,bGi =pbi=bi. As described in Kennedy (2003),
this estimator is consistent when the two variables have comparable measurement error variances
relative to the variance of the true underlying economic variables.
The second stage regression uses the residuals from the rst stage regression,
bijk = pijk   bGi wjk
and pools all goods and bilateral city pairs to estimate city xed-e¤ects ( zjk):
bijk =  zjk + 'ijk
where  zjk   j + k is the retail productivity di¤erential and the residual, 'ijk = (1  i) qijk,
represents the traded input cost ratio, which is assumed to be mean zero across goods, for each
bilateral pair. Note that while the zs capture retail productivities under the assumption of perfect
competition, they would also capture city-specic markups if retailers in each city have market
power. Since we cannot separately identify retail productivity and retail markups, we will call
zjs (log) retail productivities simply to be consistent with our competitive equilibrium model of
retailing and trade. Estimation at this stage is by OLS.
The third stage considers relative prices of traded inputs, qijk.4 To place some structure on these
trade costs, consider the no-arbitrage condition for good i, across city pair j and k:
 idjk   iBjk  qijk  idjk + iBjk (6)
where idjk+iBjk is the trade cost between city j and city k for good i; djk > 0 is the log distance
between cities j and k, i > 0 is the elasticity of trade costs with respect to distance for traded
good i, Bjk is a border dummy taking a value of 1 if cities k and j are in di¤erent countries (and 0
otherwise), and i > 0 is the logarithm of the additional cost of crossing the border between city j
and k (if one exists) with traded-input i. While the inclusion of distance is to capture geographical
barriers to trade, the inclusion of a border dummy is to capture o¢ cial barriers to international
trade. As is evident from the specication above, the border e¤ect estimated here di¤ers across
goods, but is common to all border crossings.
Equation 6 is a standard arbitrage condition showing that arbitrage is protable in the sense of
shipping goods from city k to city j only if the price in city j is high enough relative to the price in
city k to cover the arbitrage costs in that direction: qijk > idjk + iBjk. Conversely, goods should
be shipped from city j to city k when the price in city j is su¢ ciently low:  qijk > idkj + iBkj.
4Note, the trade costs are estimated as bqijk = b'ijk= (1  bi).
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Since the traded input cost ratios, (1  i) qijk, are estimated by the b'ijks, the sign of b'ijk
provides useful information on the protable direction of arbitrage. Since trade costs measured by
idjk+iBjk are positive, positive values of estimated 'ijks will be associated with city j importing
from city k, and negative values of 'ijks will be associated with city j exporting to city k, according
to our model. Thus, the direction-of-arbitrage indicator function Iijk is set to a value of 1 or  1
according to: bIijk = ( 1 if b'ijk > 0 j imports from k 1 if b'ijk < 0 k imports from j (7)
The importance of controlling for local distribution costs by using b'ijk rather than the real exchange
rates themselves should be evident: if we did not do this, our indicator function would suggest that
all goods are imported by rich nations from poor ones due to the lower price levels in poor countries
at the retail level (recall Figure 1). Clearly the rst and second stages of the regression are crucial
prior steps since they remove the local distribution cost component.
Consider, now, choosing the variables, ijk and ijk, such that Equation 6 holds with equality:
 idjk   iBjk   ijk = qijk = idjk + iBjk + ijk .
Note that given the sign conventions for these plug-in values, they satisfy ijk  0 and ijk  0.
By using the estimated direction-of-arbitrage indicator bIijk, these two equalities can be combined
in the following expression:
qijk = bIijk (idjk + iBjk) + ci + "ijk (8)
where "ijk = bikjijk+bijkijk ci. The presence of ci is to ensure that Ejk ("ijk) = 0. The indicatorbikj takes a value of 1 if the direction of trade is from city k to city j (and 0 otherwise), bijk takes a
value of  1 if the direction of trade is from city j to city k (and 0 otherwise). The two indicators
add up to the original one: bIijk = bikj + bijk. Using b'ijk = (1  bi) qijk (the tted residuals from
the second stage regression) and estimated bis from the rst stage regression: bqijk = b'ijk= (1  bi).
Thus, all the variables necessary to estimate equation 8 are available: the estimated relative input
cost, bqijk, the direction of trade indicator, bIijk, greater circle distance and border dummies (djk and
Bjk).
Although we have condence about what the good-specic intercept and residuals (ci+ "ijk) do
not represent, namely relative distribution costs (wage and retail productivity components), border-
related costs, or distance-related costs, there are a number of plausible alternative explanations for
what they do represent. The sources of these deviations from LOP unexplained by the model
include: measurement error in retail prices, deviations from LOP that are below the threshold
arbitrage value, trade costs that do not depend on distance or borders (e.g., trade nance) and
markups specic to goods rather than common to bilateral locations.
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4 The Data
We use city-level data on retail prices, wages, and the greater-circle distance in our empirical work.
The prices and wages are from the World Cost of Living Survey conducted by the Economist
Intelligence Unit (EIU). The surveys took place in 123 cities, located in 79 countries. The vast
majority of the cities in the survey are national capitals and since urban areas are typically densely
populated with higher per capita income than rural areas, these cities account for a signicant
fraction of global consumption and production; they are also typically major ports and centralized
trading locations (see Figure 2). The larger number of cities than countries is due to the fact that
the survey includes multiple cities in a few countries. Noteworthy are the 16 U.S. cities included in
the survey; the next largest number of cities surveyed equals 5 in Australia, China and Germany.
Our sample is annual from 1990 to 2005. Up to data availability for particular years and cities, the
number of goods and services surveyed by EIU sta¤ is 300. Each price observation is collected from
the same retail outlet over time. Examples of goods found in the survey are: Butter (500 grams),
Compact disc album, Light bulbs (two, 60 watts). Typical examples of services are: Dry cleaning,
mans suit (standard high-street outlet), baby-sitters rate per hour (average), Hilton-type hotel, single
room, one night including breakfast (average).
Let Pij;t be the price of good i, in city j and year t in U.S. dollars. The object of interest
is the long-run bilateral price deviation across city pair j and k, computed as the time-averaged
log-relative price:
pijk  T 1
X
t
pijk;t
where pijk;t  log (Pij;t=Pik;t).
To gain an appreciation of the relative importance of long-run price dispersion compared to time
series price variation, Figure 3 presents kernel density estimates of relative prices. The solid lines
are the distributions of the time-averaged prices, pijk, while the dashed lines are the distributions
of the annual deviations of relative prices from these long-run levels, pijk;t   pijk. The two charts
on the left are distributions for U.S. city pairs and the two charts on the right are all international
cross-border city pairs. The charts in the top row include only non-traded goods prices while the
charts in the bottom row include only traded goods prices.
If the LOP held always and everywhere, all the distributions would be degenerate at zero. Such a
situation would describe a world of frictionless trade in goods markets and instantaneous arbitrage.
Given the continuous and often large movements of nominal exchange rates and what is known
about the infrequency of local currency price changes, it is not surprising that the dashed lines
reveal transitory deviations of relative prices from their long-run means. What is very surprising
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is the distribution of the long-run means themselves. In each case, with the possible exception of
traded goods across U.S. cities, the dispersion of the long-run price distribution is greater than the
variation of the time series deviations around these long-run means. Put di¤erently, the time series
movements seem less puzzling in light of the size of the long-run deviations. This motivates our
focus on estimating the sources of long-run relative price deviations.
Table 1 presents summary statistics related to the data in Figure 3. The least amount of price
dispersion is found in U.S. traded goods, 0.29 and the greatest amount is found in the case of
non-traded goods involving international border crossings, 1.07. Remarkably, non-traded goods in
the U.S. actually have less price dispersion than do traded goods internationally, 0.54 compared to
0.68. Inter-quartile di¤erences yield similar measures of price dispersion. As originally discovered
by Crucini and Telmer (2012), time series variation is typically less than the long-run variance,
with the possible exception of traded goods across U.S. cities, and even in this case, one of the two
measures (inter-quartile di¤erence) also gives a ranking consistent with the broader samples. Notice
also that the distinction between traded and non-traded goods is obvious in the long-run measure.
This contrasts with the existing international nance literature where the time series variance of
non-traded and traded real exchange rates are found to be very comparable (Engel (1999) and
Crucini and Landry (2012)).
The remaining data utilized are wages, measures of distribution costs and distance. Directly
measuring trade costs is a signicant challenge in the literature. Hummels (2001) provides the most
comprehensive estimates of sectoral trade costs using import unit values, a more direct method than
employed here. Unfortunately, these estimates are available for a very limited number of countries
and are more aggregated than our retail price data. Instead, we follow the gravity literature in
trade and use the greater circle distance between cities in the EIU sample to estimate trade costs in
LOP deviations at the retail level. The implied trade costs are consistent with Hummels estimates.
The wage measure is hourly rate for domestic cleaning help (average) from the EIU survey. This
wage measure is chosen for a number of reasons: (i) it is city-specic, consistent with our retail
prices; ii) it spans the entire 1990-2005 sample period; (iii) the number of missing observations
is substantially lower than the alternative available wage series in the EIU survey (i.e., only 269
missing observations out of 7,503 city pairs, less than 4% of the sample), and (iv) it has a high
cross-sectional correlation with alternative source of wage data at the country level.
Sectoral U.S. NIPA data and U.S. input-output tables are used to cross-validate the distribution
share measures estimated from our regression model. Our model recovers close to 300 good-specic
distribution shares while the U.S. data provide 57 sectoral distribution shares and the input-output
data span 33 sectors. The NIPA shares are computed as the value the producers receive relative
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to the value consumers pay for the output of a particular sector. For the typical traded good,
the distribution margin computed using the consumer value less the producer value relative to the
consumer value is about 50%. That is, the retail price is about twice the producer price. However,
for services, the same NIPA data would produce an estimate of the distribution margin close to zero.
Consider a visit to the doctors o¢ ce to receive an expensive vaccine injection by a nurse. Because
of the arms length nature of the transaction, it appears as though what the consumer pays, the
producer gets. Most existing studies record the distribution margin to be zero in these situations.
However, the economic concept that the distribution margin is intended to capture in our model is
the distinction between retail prices and traded inputs. The goal is to treat the labor services of
the nurse at the doctors o¢ ce in a consistent manner with the labor services of the salesperson at
Walmart. To our knowledge, this issue has not been dealt with in the existing literature because
the focus has been mostly on traded goods.5 Since the CPI consists of a large and growing fraction
of services, measuring the distribution share for the service sector is an important facet of our work.
5 The Results
This section reports our ndings, beginning with a careful review of the parameter estimates
obtained by the three-stage regression approach using the full sample of international cities. Next,
the implications of these estimates for geographic price dispersion at the good level (i.e., deviations
from LOP) are reported using variance decompositions. Results that serve to contrast heterogeneity
across goods and the role of national borders are highlighted. Finally, the LOP deviations are
aggregated and a variance decomposition of PPP is conducted.
5.1 Parameter Estimates
The distribution share of each good i is estimated by the rst-stage regression using the GMR
estimator described in the previous section. The mean bi estimate is 0.48, while the median adjusted
R2 of the rst-stage regression is 0.34 (both taken across goods). Recall that using price levels
computed from the same data and the same wage measure (Figure 1), the slope coe¢ cient was 0.52
and the R2 was 0.37. As we shall see below, the higher slope coe¢ cient in the aggregate for PPP
is to be expected since, according to the model, it represents a consumption-expenditure-weighted
average of the microeconomic distribution shares. Since non-traded goods tend to carry the largest
5See, for example, Burstein, Neves and Rebelo (2003). Following a conversation between Crucini and Rebelo,
the distribution margin in Burstein, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2005, 2007) makes an approximate correction for this
e¤ect.
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consumption shares and involve more distribution costs (non-traded inputs), it is expected that the
PPP slope exceeds the simple average LOP slope in the cross-section.
Given that a considerable number of variables implied by our theory that are omitted in the rst
stage regression, it is natural to ask how our distribution share estimates compare to distribution
shares in the U.S. NIPA accounts and input-output tables. Since the latter are more aggregated
than our estimates, we average our good-level estimates within each NIPA sector. Table 2 compares
our microeconomic estimates to the more aggregated NIPA values at six points in the distribution.
The median distribution share is estimated to be 0.45 compared to 0.41 using US NIPA data. The
estimated values match remarkably closely throughout the distribution except at the very high-end
of the distribution: at the third quartile the estimated distribution share is 0.55 compared to 0.75
in the US NIPA.
In summary, our estimates are broadly consistent with direct U.S. NIPA measures, but our
estimates are preferred in the context of our study for three reasons. First, they are good specic
allowing our subsequent analysis and variance decompositions to exploit the richness of our micro-
price data. Second, the prices are consistent with the wage data since both are taken from the same
EIU survey. By consistent, we mean not averaged across occupations and covering the same 123
cities as the price survey. Third, the U.S. distribution shares are not necessarily representative of
those in other nations. Our estimates are literally global estimates.
The second stage of the estimation process recovers the retail productivity of each city (Zj) and
yields a median adjusted R2 of 0.40. Table 3 provides summary statistics for the Zjs, which are
all statistically signicant at 5% level. The mean and median are not informative because they
reect an arbitrary choice of units in which to measure productivity. What is interesting are the
large di¤erences in productivity across cities, the third quartile city is 65% more productive than
the rst quartile city. In terms of the retail sector, the most productive city is 6.6 (3.32/0.50) times
more productive than the least productive city.
To cross-validate our inference about retail productivity, the estimated Zjs are compared to
distribution sector productivities from the GGDC Productivity Level Database. This database
covers only 18 of the 79 countries in the EIU sample. For countries in the EIU sample with more
than one city in the price survey, we take the simple average of city-level retail productivities as
our estimate of national retail productivity. The correlation between the two estimates of retail
productivity across the 18 countries common to both samples is 0.48.
The e¤ects of trade costs are estimated in the third-stage regression described earlier, which have
a median adjusted R2 of 0.61. The summary statistics for distance elasticities (is), which are all
statistically signicant at the 5% level, are reported in Table 3. The median distance elasticity is 0.05
11
which implies that price deviations increase by 40% per 1,000 miles of distance between the source
and destination. Taking into account that traded inputs account for only a fraction of the retail
price, the average e¤ect of 1,000 miles of distance on retail prices is given by exp
bi (1  bi) djk 1.
Evaluated at the median values of both the distance elasticities and distribution share parameters
implies about a 21% increase in the retail price from source to destination from the trade cost
channel.
The calculation above does not take into account the possible impact of market segmentation
associated with national borders. The border e¤ects are statistically signicant at the 5% level.
Borders are also economically signicant. For the median good, the border adds 33% to the traded-
input price (see Table 3). Taking into account the share of traded inputs in the production of
the median retail good using, bi (1  bi), the average border wedge is 18%. Engel and Rogers
(1996) have popularized the transformation of price deviations into distance equivalent measures.
The border e¤ect in distance equivalent units is computed as exp
bi=bi. The average border
e¤ect across goods, pooling all location pairs, is 735 miles. The median border width is 522 miles.
As one might expect, the di¤erences across goods are large. Moving from the rst quartile of
the distribution of the border e¤ect to the third quartile, the border width increases from a mere
38 miles to an astounding 55,322 miles.6 Interestingly, the rst quartile contains the traded good,
banana, while the third quartile contains the non-traded good, a three course dinner for four people.
What this suggests to us it that extrapolating the distance metric becomes less useful as the item
in question becomes inherently less traded in the sense of being produced mostly with local inputs.
In such cases it is preferable to report price dispersion and attempt to account for that dispersion
with something other than iceberg shipping costs.
The cumulative explanatory power of the three-stage estimation is a useful metric for summa-
rizing the completeness of our model in accounting for price dispersion. The median R-bar squared
value across goods is 0.72. In other words, the parsimonious set of controls account for the bulk of
good-level heterogeneity in long-run price deviations. Having described the parameter estimates
and their economic interpretations, it is now possible to decompose the variance of LOP and PPP
deviations into the contributions of retail productivity, wages, distance and borders.
6The baseline border width estimate of Engel and Rogers (1996) was 75,000 miles. It is not possible to make a
direct comparison between our estimates and theirs for a number of reasons. First, they use the time series variance
of changes in relative prices. Second, they use CPI data aggregated to roughly two-digit categories. Third, they
focus on U.S.-Canada city pairs.
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5.2 Variance Decompositions
The goal is to explain the variance of relative prices across all unique city pairs, good-by-good7:
Vi = varjk(pijk)
and for price levels in the aggregate, V = varjk(pjk). We begin with the analytics of how interna-
tional price dispersion in underlying factor inputs translates into variance in nal goods prices at
the microeconomics and macroeconomics levels.
Starting with microeconomic sources of price dispersion, the larger is Vi, the greater are the
deviations from LOP over the geography of locations index by j and k. The natural economic
benchmark for the lower bound is when the LOP holds across all bilateral pairs used in the cal-
culation, in which case, Vi = 0. The model is designed to elucidate the sources of price dispersion
emanating from plausible real frictions related to economic geography.
Recall that the log-relative price consists of three main components, two related to retailing
(relative TFP in retailing and the relative wages of the retailers) and the relative cost of acquiring
the traded input:
pijk =  zjk + iwjk + (1  i) qijk .
Substituting our model of the traded input component into this equation gives the rather intimi-
dating expression,
pijk =  zjk + iwjk + (1  i) [bIijk (idjk + iBjk) + ci + "ijk] . (9)
The variance decomposition will be computed using the fact that var(pijk) = cov(pijk; pijk) with
the second pijk replaced by all of the terms on the right-hand-side of (9). The resulting variance
decomposition is:
1 = iz + iiw| {z }
Distribution costs
+ (1  i)iid + (1  i) iiB| {z }
Trade costs
+ (1  i) i"| {z }
Unexplained
.
The use of the notation  is natural here since the contribution of each component to the variance is
e¤ectively a regression coe¢ cient. For example, iw = covjk (wjk; pijk) =varjk(pijk) is the coe¢ cient
from a regression of relative wages on relative prices of good i across all city-pairs. Essentially this
component tells us the role of international wage dispersion on retail price dispersion of good i,
across locations. The fact that iw is pre-multiplied by the coe¢ cient i means that a xed amount
7The variance metric is di¤erent from the one used by Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005) to study price
dispersion across European capital cities. They normalized prices to their cross-city means, varj(pij   pi), which
does not allow for the role of bilateral distance in the trade cost component of our structural model.
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of geographic wage dispersion has an e¤ect on retail price dispersion that is increasing in the share
of distribution in cost.
The contribution of traded inputs is more nuanced, involving a traditional trade cost component
and a border e¤ect. As one would expect, both terms are weighted by the cost share of traded inputs,
(1  i). The rst component is a traditional shipping cost and involves the product of i and id.
Recall that i is the good-specic elasticity of trade cost with respect to distance; ceteris paribus,
a good that is more costly to transport will contribute more to the variance of retail prices. The
more subtle part of the expression is the covariance between relative prices at the retail level and
interaction of the direction of trade indicator and distance, the id = cov(bIijkdjk; pijk)=varjk(pijk)
term. Due to the presence of the indicator function and how it was dened, this is the coe¢ cient of a
regression of the absolute value of the relative price of traded inputs on the retail price. Intuitively,
we want to relate trade costs to distance in a symmetric fashion in the sense that the distance
matters, not the direction of trade. The absolute value ensures that trade costs are non-negative
in the estimation equation. Basically, if retail price deviations are increasing in the estimated trade
cost, which themselves are rising in distance, then trade costs contribute positively to long-run price
dispersion. The contribution is greater for locations separated by greater distances since i > 0.
Holding distance xed, goods that are more costly to ship, greater i, will exhibit more long-run
price dispersion. The border e¤ect contributes only to the variance of cross-border city pairs and
does so as a level e¤ect, not as a function of distance. The level e¤ect is good specic due to the
presence of i.
Turning to relative price levels and PPP, consider the cost-of-living index for city j motivated
by reference to a Cobb-Douglas aggregator function:
Pj =
Y
i
(Pij)
!i
where !i is the consumption-expenditure-share of good i.
Using the equation for LOP 9 and the aggregator above, the log deviations from PPP may be
written as:
pjk = zk   zj + (
X
i
!ii)wjk +
X
i
!i (1  i)bIijkidjk (10)
+
X
i
!i (1  i)bIijkiBjk +X
i
!i (1  i) ci +
X
i
!i (1  i) "ijk
where pjk = log (Pj=Pk) is the aggregate real exchange rate across city pair j and k.
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The variance decomposition of real exchange rates (using Equation 10) is:
1 = z + !w| {z }
Distribution costs
+
X
i
!i(1  i)[iid + iiB]| {z }
Trade costs
+
X
i
!i (1  i)"| {z }
Unexplained
where ! =
X
i
!ii and the s are now covariances using the same right-hand-variables as before,
but with the aggregate real exchange rate, pjk, replacing the LOP deviations.
5.2.1 Variance Decomposition Across Goods
Figures 4 and 5 present the variance decomposition in the cross-section of goods, sorted by the
estimated distribution share, bi. At the left-hand boundary are goods with 0.20 of their cost
attributed to distribution inputs and the rest of the cost attributed to the traded good itself.
Unleaded gasoline is an example of such a good. The right-hand boundary is a pure service, such as
the hourly wage of baby-sitters. The variance of retail prices (Vi) is the upper contour. We clearly
see a positive relationship between the distribution share and price dispersion. The increases are
substantial. For example, goods involving the lowest distribution share practically satisfy the LOP
in the case of Canada and the United States and among OECD cities, whereas the deviations for
services approach 80%. The countries included in the sample matter for both the absolute level of
price dispersion and the relative contributions of various components. Price dispersion is uniformly
greater across LDC city pairs andWorld city pairs than across cities of the OECD or North America.
It is important to point out that the obvious contribution of non-traded inputs in these gures
contrasts sharply with much of the existing international nance literature where skepticism re-
garding the value of the HBS theory originated. In that literature, the time series variance of the
real exchange rates of two sub-indices of the CPI are typically used to elucidate the HBS theory
(e.g., Engel (1999)). Recall, however, that in Table 1 the short-run variance (a measure of time
series variance) failed to reveal a sharp di¤erence in variability of real exchange rates across traded
and non-traded goods. That classication, however, is based on applying the HBS theory to nal
goods, not intermediate inputs. Crucini and Landry (2012) show that the time series variance of
LOP deviations are in fact rising in the distribution share. In other words, when the HBS theory
is applied to intermediate inputs, it is successful in accounting for di¤erences in both the long-run
and the short-run properties of price dispersion.
Turning to the details, intranational price dispersion, displayed in the left-hand charts, is largely
accounted for by distance. International price dispersion is driven signicantly by three components:
wages, distance and borders. The relative importance of the three depends on the set of locations
under examination and di¤ers across goods. As expected, the wage component becomes more
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important as we move from, say unleaded gasoline to baby-sitting services (left-to-right along the
x-axis). This is because the distribution share is much higher for the latter than the former item
and wage di¤erences play a crucial role in distribution costs.
The absolute amount of price dispersion also depends on the set of locations used in the analysis.
Samples of cities which span nations at very di¤erent level of development will exhibit more price
dispersion with a large role for distribution costs and wages. The reason for this is obvious, unskilled
labor is relatively abundant and cheap in poorer countries than in richer ones and thus there is a
large wedge driven between retail prices across those city pairs. As we move from the World or
LDC geography of locations to the OECD or North America total price dispersion falls as wage
dispersion also falls.
5.2.2 Variance Decomposition for the Average Good
As the previous sub-section demonstrated, the underlying sources of deviations from the LOP
depend on where in the distribution of goods one looks. This sub-section provides a summary of
the decomposition for the good in the cross-section with the average amount of geographic price
dispersion. In particular, Table 4 reports the averages across goods of total long-run price dispersion
and the estimated contribution of each cost component to that average.
The averages reported in Table 4 are inuenced by the fact that goods are not equally distributed
over the distribution shares of 0.2 to 1.0 displayed in the gures. For example, the modal good
is a food item with a distribution share of about 0.37 (whereas the median share is 0.45). The
columns labelled NB report results that use only within country city pairs in the analysis whereas
the columns labelled B report results that use only city pairs separated by a national border. The
main column headings, LDC, OECD and CAN-US describe the regions in which these cities are
located while WORLD is the entire pooled sample of 123 cities. The upper panel of the table
reports the absolute geographic variance coming from each economic channel while the lower panel
reports the proportion of the total variance accounted for by each economic channel.
Table 4 shows the dominant factor accounting of geographic microeconomic price dispersion
are trade costs. Recall that trade costs are the sum of traditional trade costs (distance) and a
border e¤ect. The border e¤ect for the average good is between 7.55% and 10.39%. Distance
contributes between 6.44% to 14.7%. The heterogeneity across location in the role of distance is
intuitive: it reects the di¤erences in the average distance separating bilateral city pairs in the
respective columns. Intranational city pairs are almost by denition, cities that are closer together
with greater circle distances averaging 856 miles compared to 4,054 for international pairs. The
absolute contribution of distance is predicted to increase from 6.55 to 13.70 as a consequence. An
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interesting exception is North America where intranational city pairs are almost as far apart as
international city pairs, 1,083 versus 1,134. Consequently, distance is estimated to account for a
comparable amount of absolute price dispersion in the last two columns, 7.04 versus 8.18.
The role of distribution costs, which is the sum of service wages and retail productivity, depends
on the city pairs included in the comparison. As one might expect, the role of distribution costs
is signicantly elevated when the comparisons involve cities in di¤erent countries. The reason for
this is that the cost of moving from one city to another to arbitrage wage di¤erences is much lower
within countries than across them. This is why within-country wage dispersion is often ignored in
macroeconomic models whereas across country wage dispersion constitutes a central question in the
development literature. It is not necessary for us to determine the underlying sources of labor unit
cost di¤erences across cities to conduct our variance decompositions. For example, they could be
driven mostly by prohibitive costs of cross-border arbitrage due to limits on legal immigration or
institutions that limit technological progress in the service sector.
Consistent with this discussion, the absolute contribution of distribution costs ranges from 3.4%
for cross-border cities pairs in North America (CAN-US) to 18.74% worldwide. Canada and the
United States are obviously at similar stages of development and much more economically and
nancially integrated than most other country pairs. When comparisons involve city pairs within
the same country, distribution costs are understandably very similar as evident in the dispersion
measures that range from a low of 1.96% for within country cities pairs in the OECD sub-sample
to a high of 5.21% in the LDC sub-sample. The greater role of retail productivity in the LDC
sample may reect great variance in retail infrastructure cost across cities within China and India
compared to cities within countries like the United States, Canada, Germany and Australia, which
account for a disproportionate number of intranational city pairs in the larger sample.
Turning to proportions of variance explained, in the lower panel of Table 4, for cross-border
city pairs (B), the contribution shares of borders, distance and distribution are each substantial
with the ranking dependent somewhat on the set of countries used in the analysis. Trade costs
(sum of borders and distance) ranges in contribution from 40% to 60% of total LOP variation and
always exceed that of distribution costs.8 It is notable that the contribution of distribution costs is
more stable across country groups than are the separate contributions of service wages and retail
productivity.
It is important to note that despite shorter distance and thus lower trade costs between cities
8The absolute variance attributed to the width of the border is comparable across panels, but accounts for a larger
share of price dispersion for Canada and the United States because the absolute amount of dispersion in prices is
substantially lower between Canada and the United States than almost anywhere else, including the OECD sample,
18.53 versus 31.58.
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within countries (NB), trade costs actually account for a larger fraction of total price dispersion
intranationally than internationally because the absolute variance is smaller intranationally. Within
countries, distance accounts for close to half of overall dispersion and this is robust across the panels.
To summarize, the model has provided a useful conceptual framework with which to conduct a
variance decomposition of long-run LOP deviations into the role of distance, borders, wages, retail
productivity and a residual. The relative importance of the factors depends on the good and set
of locations in a fashion that makes intuitive sense. Distance and borders loom large in general
and wages di¤erences (consistent with HBS) seem particularly important once the analysis moves
outside the OECD (i.e., once comparisons involve countries at very di¤erent income levels). We
turn now to the aggregate implications of our model for PPP.
5.2.3 Variance Decomposition of Price Levels
Macroeconomic analysis, of course, takes place at a much more aggregated level than these micro-
price data. It is natural to ask how the sources of international price variation di¤er at the aggregate
level from what was documented in the previous section.
The most obvious consequence of aggregation is that it eliminates spatial variation in relative
prices specic to individual goods. The magnitude of the variance reduction, however, is larger than
one might have expected. As is evident in Table 5, the dispersion in price levels across locations
is on the order of one-fourth to one-fth as large as the mean level of dispersion at the level of
individual goods and services.9
Two obvious sources of variation that would average out across goods are measurement error and
trade costs. Classical measurement error is, by denition, independently distributed across goods.
The fact that the residual variance, particularly for the cross-border pairs where measurement error
is likely to be greater, falls from 15% to 0.5% (WORLD) is consistent with this view. The absolute
and proportional contribution of borders and trade costs are also mitigated by aggregation. This
is also quite intuitive. Countries long-run trade imbalances are modest. Consequently, the high
relative price of goods that a nation imports is counter-balanced by the low relative price of goods
that it exports. Provided trade costs are not too asymmetric across goods on across ledgers of
the trade balance, they will tend to average out in the cross-section. Table 5 indicates that the
absolute variance contribution of trade costs falls from a range of 5%-15% for individual relative
prices (LOP) toward a range of 1%-2% for relative price levels (PPP).
Contrast this with the economic role of the distribution margin. By denition, the relative costs
9The averaging-out property of LOP deviations was rst documented by Crucini, Telmer and Zachariadis (2005)
in the context of mostly EU capital cities over the period 1975 to 1990 at ve-year intervals.
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of distribution is location specic, not good specic. Table 5 shows that at that aggregate level,
relative wages account for virtually the entire variance (91.5%) when all cross-border city pairs are
included in the calculation. Note that the coe¢ cient on wjk in Equation 10 can be estimated from
a regression of log relative price levels on log relative wages. Such a regression produces a coe¢ cient
of 0.55 on wages and an R2 of 0:85. According to the microeconomic model of distribution, the
same coe¢ cient can be estimated from the micro-price data simply by calculating the consumption-
expenditure-weighted average of distribution shares,
X
i
!ii. And what is this sum? Exactly
0.55!
This implies that an important facet of macroeconomic analysis is the interaction of tastes and
technology in determining the local or non-traded factor content of consumption expenditure. That
is, tastes enter into the determine of expenditure shares, !i, and the patterns of tastes across goods
may amplify or mitigate the role of the distribution share in accounting for PPP deviations. In
modern data the covariance of the expenditure share and the distribution share is positive in the
cross-section. Goods with relatively high distribution shares tend to account for a larger share of
consumption expenditure than those with below average distribution shares. Thus, the expenditure-
weighted distribution share is higher than the average distribution share across goods (0.55 versus
0.48).
The results for intranational city pairs provide an interesting contrast. As one would expect,
labor mobility tends to eliminate the role of wages in accounting for deviations from PPP. To a
rst approximation, the variance shifts from wages to retail productivity. This seems reasonable
because retailing involves signicant time-to-build and an immobile factor (land), which limits
arbitrage across locations. An evolving literature asks how big-box retailers such as Walmart may
alter the distribution margin across locations. It is also important not to overstate the implications
of the PPP analysis across cities within countries. The absolute dispersion of prices is relatively
minor and this limits our ability to identify the contributions of di¤erent components with the same
degree of accuracy as in the international case.
6 Discussion
Our competitive model completely abstracts from markups. There are two places where it seems
natural to allow for markups over marginal cost. The rst is at the retail level, a markup of retail
prices over the unit cost of retailing (including both distribution and traded input costs) that di¤ers
across city pairs. A city may have a relatively high price level than we predict based on relative
wage costs and relative traded input costs (i.e., pjk   bwjk   qjk =  zjk > 0) either because it has
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a relatively ine¢ cient retail sector (zjk < 0, perhaps due to poor public infrastructure) or because
retailers have market power and choose to set di¤erent markups over marginal cost across cities. In
the latter case, the zjk < 0 term could reect a relatively high markup in city j compared to k, not
relative ine¢ ciency in retail in city j compared to k. Arguably, cities with ine¢ cient infrastructure
may also tend to be those with less competitive retailing. Consider a very e¢ cient big-box retailer
such as Walmart in a U.S. suburb compared to an open market in the center of Istanbul. One would
expect the average markup over marginal cost to fall upon Walmarts entry into the Istanbul market
in the same fashion that Walmart has lowered retail prices in the United States over time. While
this is plausible, our data are simply not up to the task of exploring these alternative interpretations
of the retail productivity term and these issues are thus left to future work.
The second place a markup would naturally appear is between the factory gate price and the
price the retailer pays for the traded input, qijk. Thus some of the variation in traded prices we
attribute to borders, distance and a residual term could be due to markups that exporters charge to
the various destination markets. Where such a markup over cost on imported goods gets allocated in
our variance decomposition depends crucially on its covariance with other location-specic variables
used in our regression framework. If the markup is not correlated with wages, distance or borders,
it will be relegated to the residual term.
More problematic is the idea that markups of retail prices over factory gate prices are positively
correlated with wages in the destination market since this is inconsistent with the orthogonality
assumption used to estimate the distribution share. The notion that markups are increasing in the
wage levels in the destination market was rst theoretically developed in Alessandria (2004) and
empirical tested by Alessandria and Kaboski (2011). They estimated a robust positive correlation
between good-level U.S. export unit values and aggregate wage levels in the destination market.
They attribute this correlation to costly search by consumers in retail markets. The implication
of this line of reasoning for our work is that our regression coe¢ cient would overestimate the
distribution cost share based on a standard omitted regressor bias argument.10
Identication of markups, of course, is a challenge confronting many sub-elds of macroeco-
nomics. The model that we develop and estimate is based on the premise that markets are perfectly
competitive. The NIPA is constructed along these same lines in the sense that payments to labor
and capital exhaust value added, there is no separate line item for markups over unit cost. An
important task going forward is to consider how bargaining power and imperfect competition leads
shares of payments to factors of production that exceed their shares in the production function. All
10That is, if an omitted regressor (markup) is positively correlated with an included regressor (wages), the coe¢ cient
on the included regressor (the distribution margin) is biased upward.
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that may be claimed at this point is that both our estimating approach and variance accounting of
LOP and PPP deviations are consistent with the NIPA constructs.
7 Conclusion
The growth of international trade and nancial integration has moved the elds of international
trade and international nance ever closer. This is a healthy development, bringing together the
microeconomic details of trade theory such as patterns of specialization and the extensive margin
of trade with the central facets of macroeconomic theory, dynamic equilibrium concepts and expec-
tation formation. The fact that trade focuses on absolute deviations from the LOP while nance
focuses on relative deviations from PPP has been an impediment to progress. Recent e¤orts to
expand the availability of large-scale micro-price panels allows absolute deviations from PPP to be
traced back to LOP deviations as was done in this paper.
The amount of price dispersion at the good level is 3 to 5 times larger than at the aggregate,
PPP level. The main cause of this averaging out of deviations specic to the good is attributed
to trade costs and a residual term. The residual term may involve markups specic to the good
and bilateral city pair as well as measurement error. What remains at the PPP level is largely a
wage e¤ect consistent with the HBS theory, though how dominant this factor is depends on the set
of countries studied. Retail productivities and trade costs remain substantial at the PPP level for
OECD countries, while they are dwarfed by wage e¤ects when all international cities are pooled,
consistent with the impression given by Figure 1.
E¤ectively, this means that theories intended to match relative prices both within the OECD
and between the OECD and the rest of the world will need to include both a rich trade structure
drawn from trade theory and a role for the distribution margin and markups. The importance of
markups relative to real costs of wholesale and distribution remains an open question.
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TABLE 1 PRICE DISTRIBUTIONS (SUMMARY STATISTICS)
Traded goods Non-traded goods
U.S. World U.S. World
No border Border No border Border
Standard Deviation
Long-run 0.294 0.681 0.543 1.069
Short-run 0.250 0.412 0.258 0.488
Interquartile Range
Long-run 0.385 0.796 0.616 1.092
Short-run 0.295 0.417 0.295 0.430
Notes: The long-run values have been calculated by the time-averaged prices, while the short-run
values have been calculated as deviations from the long-run values.
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TABLE 2 DISTRIBUTION SHARES
Estimated from U.S. sectoral
EIU micro-data NIPA data
Minimum 0.20 0.17
First Quartile 0.36 0.36
Median 0.45 0.41
Mean 0.48 0.53
Third Quartile 0.55 0.75
Maximum 1.00 1.00
Notes: Since the distribution shares in the U.S. NIPA are more aggregated than the estimates
of distribution shares in this paper, the good-level estimates have been averaged within each NIPA
sector.
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TABLE 3 RETAIL PRODUCTIVITY, TRADE COSTS AND BORDERS
Retail Productivity Distance Elasticity Border e¤ect
(Bj) (i) (i)
Minimum 0.50 0.00 0.02
First Quartile 0.75 0.04 0.21
Median 0.97 0.05 0.33
Mean 1.09 0.09 0.52
Third Quartile 1.24 0.08 0.49
Maximum 3.32 2.15 5.30
Notes: Each column independently depicts the summary statistics for the corresponding vari-
able/parameter.
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TABLE 4 ACCOUNTING FOR LONG-RUN DEVIATIONS FROM LOP
WORLD LDC OECD CAN-US
NB B NB B NB B NB B
Price dispersion 15:03 58:63 24:83 64:83 13:33 31:58 14:19 18:53
Absolute contribution of:
Border e¤ect   10:39   11:13   7:98   7:55
Distance 6:44 13:70 7:57 14:70 6:55 10:42 7:04 8:18
Distribution Sector 2:56 18:74 5:21 18:08 1:96 8:53 2:25 3:40
Service wages 0:42 18:70 1:10 10:71 0:19 2:22 0:15 2:77
Retail productivity 2:14 0:04 4:10 7:37 1:76 6:31 2:10 0:63
Residual 5:93 15:54 11:93 20:67 4:74 4:49 4:82  0:76
Percentage contribution of:
Border   17:7   17:2   25:3   40:7
Distance 42:9 23:4 30:5 22:7 49:2 33:0 49:6 44:1
Distribution Sector 17:0 32:0 20:9 27:9 14:7 27:0 15:9 18:4
Service wages 2:8 31:9 4:4 16:5 1:4 7:0 1:1 14:9
Retail productivity 14:2 0:1 16:5 11:4 13:2 20:0 14:8 3:4
Residual 39:4 26:5 48:0 31:9 35:5 14:2 33:9  4:1
Average miles separating cities 856 4; 054 564 3; 944 896 3; 216 1; 083 1; 134
Notes: LDC stands for less developed countries, CAN-US stands for Canada-U.S., NB stands
for no border, B stands for border.
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TABLE 5 ACCOUNTING FOR LONG-RUN DEVIATIONS FROM PPP
WORLD LDC OECD CAN-US
NB B NB B NB B NB B
Price dispersion 3:53 15:89 4:53 15:48 3:14 10:07 3:33 5:15
Absolute contribution of:
Border e¤ect   0:12   0:18   0:23   0:18
Distance 0:82 1:01 0:28 1:53 0:85 1:95 0:93 1:26
Distribution Sector 2:10 14:12 2:80 12:50 1:74 7:47 1:89 3:43
Service wages 0:28 14:55 0:31 8:78 0:18 1:35 0:16 3:69
Retail productivity 1:82  0:43 2:49 3:72 1:57 6:13 1:73  0:25
Residual 0:62 0:67 1:44 1:25 0:55 0:36 0:51 0:22
Percentage contribution of:
Border e¤ect   0:8   1:2   2:3   3:5
Distance 23:2 6:4 6:2 9:9 27:1 19:4 27:9 24:4
Distribution Sector 59:4 88:8 61:8 80:8 55:5 74:2 56:7 66:7
Service wages 7:9 91:5 6:8 56:7 5:7 13:4 4:8 71:5
Retail productivity 51:4  2:7 55:0 24:0 50:0 60:9 52:0  4:8
Residual 17:5 4:2 31:7 8:1 17:3 3:6 15:3 4:2
Notes: LDC stands for less developed countries, CAN-US stands for Canada-U.S., NB stands
for no border, B stands for border.
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Figure 1. Relative price levels and relative wages of domestic help 
 
Notes: Each x-coordinate is a city wage relative to the world average. For the large dots, the y-coordinates are the price 
levels of each city relative to the world price level. The price levels are computed as consumption-expenditure-weighted 
average of the individual prices. The line through the scatterplot is an ordinary least squares estimate with slope 0.52 and 
a standard error of (0.05), using the price levels. For the small dots, the y-coordinates are prices of individual goods and 
services relative to the world average price of those items. 
 
 Figure 2. Cities surveyed by the Economist Intelligence Unit 
 
Note: Each symbol marks the location of a city surveyed by the EIU. There are 123 in total. Most of the cities are national 
capitals located on the coast in the cases of nations not land-locked. Cases in which multiple cities are surveyed in the 
same country are marked with a common color. 
 
 
Figure 3. Kernel Density Estimates of Price Distributions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The solid lines are kernel density estimates of the distribution of , time averaged LOP deviations over the period 
1990-2005. The dashed lines are kernel density estimates of the distribution of time series deviations from these long-run 
values. Each chart contains a different location and commodity grouping as indicated by the headers. 
 
 
Figure 4. Sources of price dispersion and the distribution share () 
 
 
Canada-U.S. Intranational
 
Canada-U.S. International 
 
 
OECD Intranational 
 
 
OECD International 
 
Note: The figures show the sources of price dispersion with respect to the distribution share (). 
Figure 5. Sources of price dispersion and the distribution share () 
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LDC Intranational 
 
 
LDC International 
 
Note: The figures show the sources of price dispersion with respect to the distribution share (). 
